Project Review

Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia (SDEP) Project

Report of Mission

November 2008

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I.   Introduction

From 23 October to 1 November 2008, a Project Review Mission visited Cambodia to assess the Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia (SDEP) project, and to offer strategic recommendations for future areas of electoral support. The Review Team comprised representatives of UNDP's Democratic Governance Group of the Bureau for Development Policy (DGG/BDP); the Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (EAD/DPA); and the Asia and Pacific Division of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (APD/DPA). The team was also complemented by an independent consultant who followed up on the mission findings and worked with UNDP Cambodia to formulate more concrete work plans for future activity.

The objectives of the Review Mission were:

- To assess the overall technical support provided to electoral processes in Cambodia, including the support to the 2008 National Assembly Elections; and

- To provide overall guidance for continuing the project in the short term, building on the performance assessment and technical reports prepared through the project.

As the SDEP project underwent a mid-term review in May 2007, the Project Review team was asked to focus on the 18 months of activity between the mid-term review and the end of the project period, which is 31 December 2008. In addition, the Review Team was asked to concentrate on two years of future activity given the expressed desire of the UNDP country office to extend the project into a second phase to build on the gains made thus far, while also completing the current country programming cycle. This will harmonize all future support – in electoral assistance and other areas – along the country programming planning cycle which begins in 2011.

The Review Team met with a broad range of stakeholders, including the National Election Committee (NEC); political parties; civil society organizations; international development partners; international organizations; Royal Government of Cambodia officials; UN agencies; and SDEP project personnel and consultants.

Before assessing the support provided through the SDEP project – particularly during the last 18 months since the mid-term review – it is useful to frame such support within the context of previous UN assistance to peace, recovery and electoral processes in Cambodia. The UN has supported the Cambodian people in their pursuit of peace, security and reconciliation since the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991. This has included support to four national elections (1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008) and two commune-level elections (2002 and 2007). While it is clear that significant gains have been made in terms of electoral administration since 1993, concerns linger regarding specific technical aspects of the electoral process, as well as the overall political context within which elections take place. In Cambodia, elections are broadly perceived as being fairly well run. However, concerns remain that

the space for debate and expression of opposing viewpoints in both election and non-election periods has not improved significantly since 1993.

UNDP is involved in electoral assistance in Cambodia as one plank in its democratic governance programme, which in turn is a pivotal component of the overall strategy to help Cambodia achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.

II.   Assessment of the Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia Project (SDEP)

a. General comments

The original design of the SDEP project dates back to 2004. The project originally intended to address the period immediately following the national elections of 2003 and help prepare the ground over the longer-term for the 2007 commune council and the 2008 national elections. As such, it was one of the first genuine "between-the-ballot-boxes" initiatives – an approach that has now become standard in UNDP. However, due to a number of factors, the project took longer than expected to start implementation[1] and therefore ended up needing to directly address both the commune council and national elections during implementation. This tended to **distract attention** from the longer-term support to laws, institutions and processes that was originally intended.

The SDEP project has produced a very high number of outputs and implemented many activities, particularly during the last two years of activity. Most of the outputs seem to have been appreciated by the stakeholders of the project and have been described as of good quality and useful. However, there was also the view expressed by some that there was at times **too much of a focus on activities and outputs without the necessary link to the larger development outcomes** originally identified by the project.

As a sub-point of the output and activity driven approach, there was some criticism voiced that the project made too much use of **short-term experts** who visited Cambodia for relatively brief periods of time to consult with the national institutions and produced a **large number of reports** that donors said they did not have time to read. The Review Team was told that at least some of the short-term consultants were used as a means to correct misperceptions about the project or convince stakeholders that a redirection was necessary (for example, to examine in depth and through an independent source whether the perception that Equity News programming was "to soft"). While this was certainly of value periodically, in general it seems clear that the stakeholders would appreciate fewer, high quality consultancies and products that take place over a longer period of time.

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[1] Mid-Term Review of SDEP, Report of Mission, final version dated 17 July 2007.

Related to this, the different outputs, multiple stakeholders and wide range of activities meant that the project covered a lot of ground but also suffered from a dispersion of effort and lack of synergy between activities within the project. There is a need in the future to **consolidate some activities, focus effort and promote more synergies** within the project and between the project and other democratic governance initiatives such as those in parliamentary development and decentralization/local governance.

Notwithstanding the above comments, there is clear evidence of progress towards the higher-level results the project was trying to achieve. Specifically, the project was designed to help strengthen the "management capacity" and improve the "enabling environment" for free and fair elections at national and local levels in Cambodia. According to the project monitoring reports and virtually all of the interlocutors with whom the Review Team met, good progress has been made on the first part of this outcome but more can and should be done on the second part. The Review Mission therefore recommends **focusing on improving the enabling environment** during the second phase of the project.

Finally, a number of interlocutors with whom the Review Team met spoke of UNDP having **regained a degree of impartiality** in the area of electoral support that had somehow been lost in the past. Civil society organizations and opposition parties in particular spoke of the enhanced credibility of UNDP's work in the sector over the last two years, and a sense of balance that they felt had been missing in the past. There seems to be a new moment of opportunity for continuing the momentum and building on UNDP's good reputation as an honest broker on electoral issues.

In order to achieve the outcome of strengthened management capacity and improved enabling environment for free and fair elections, the SDEP project aimed to produce four main outputs that correspond to the project's components. These are: increased capacity and leadership of the NEC; enhanced normative electoral framework and processes; increased civic engagement, participation and democratic culture; and support to the national elections of 2008. Each of these is addressed below, with an emphasis on the last 18 months of activity.

b. Increased capacity and leadership of the NEC

Summary of Component 1: Under the project, UNDP provided the NEC with advisory, printing, broadcasting and production services for voter education. The project also sponsored training for the Commune Clerks to carry out registration of voters (as well as supported the associated activities of logistics, printing, implementation and monitoring), and training of the Provincial and Commune Election Committees (PECs and CECs, respectively) to handle the complaints and appeals process better. Finally, this component provided support to the NEC in more effective use of information technology.

The first output of component one focused on the production, with the NEC, of videos and posters – including a training video for poll workers, which was then made available to political parties to train

their agents. It is difficult to judge the impact of the activities on the level of knowledge among the electorate or the level of professionalization of the poll workers or political party agents. The Review Team did hear that there were fewer incidences of violence and fewer electoral complaints lodged, compared to previous elections and certainly better training may have been on factor in this, albeit one factor among many.

This component of the project also focused on enhancing the participation of women as candidates and voters through a joint initiative with UNIFEM and the Committee to Promote Women in Politics (CPWP); on enhancing the disabled participation in elections through an initiative with the Cambodian Disabled People's Organization (CDPO); and young voter sensitization as well as training of domestic observers through a joint initiative with COMFREL. While the effects of these activities may have been limited in terms of actual numbers of women, youth or disabled voters, the long-term effects of advocacy conducted by the project should not be underestimated.

With respect to the second output of this component – training of village chiefs, commune officials, and PECs and CECs – according to the interlocutors with whom the Review Team met, compared to previous elections there was an overall decline in the number of electoral complaints leveled against local officials – including village chiefs – and a significant change in the way the PECs and CECs handled election complaints that were lodged. Whereas in the past these complaints tended to be dismissed out of hand, in the 2008 elections there were more complaints formally recorded and sent through the process to the NEC. The Review Team was told that this was the result not only of training sponsored through the project, but also of a directive issued by the NEC to the PECs and CECs to handle complaints in a more professional manner.

The final output under this component included providing the NEC with IT support – specifically, internet access in order to more effectively liaise with the public. This certainly seems like a useful service to provide, though the NEC did mention their limitations in terms of translation capacity and requested that the SDEP project provide them with more support in translating key texts from Khmer into English, in order to effectively communicate with the international community as well.

c.   **Enhanced normative electoral framework and processes**

Summary of Component 2: This component covered voter registration, including an audit of the voter's register to get a more accurate sense of how many names had been improperly struck from the list (the proposed figure after the audit was approximately 57,000 people). This component also included support to the National ID card programme; to a revised legal framework that strengthens the NEC's independence; and to improved complaints and appeals procedures.

Despite tangible progress in a number of areas under this component, it is probably the component showing the least progress among the four of the revised SDEP project. The voter register audit certainly helped stopped the wild speculation of how many people had been struck from the list and gave stakeholders, for the first time, a plausible figure to react to. However, before and on election

day, there were still significant complaints about the accuracy of the voter register, with voters arriving at the polling station to find that their names were not on the lists. This was an issue raised by all international and domestic observer reports consulted by the Review Team and clearly remains a cause for concern in the electoral process.

The Review Team was told that UNDP did a relatively good job in the time it had available and within the confines of the set up on the ID card issue but that, as with the voter register, there remain significant core issues with the design and implementation of the ID card system. One interlocutor with whom the Review Team spoke said she could not understand where the selection of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) came from, as there never seemed to have been a well thought through consideration of advanced information technology and its application in Cambodia or, if there had been, it had not been sufficiently explained to key stakeholders. Certainly, the selection of a system requiring the recording of 10 digits, despite the need only to match the two index fingers, raises questions in some quarters as to why all 10 fingers would be needed in an ID database. In an electoral and political environment that is fraught with mistrust, this kind of choice can easily raise suspicion if not properly rationalized and explained.

Another issue raised by those with whom the Review Team met was the incompatibility of the ID card databases (there are three which need to be harmonized) with the voter register and with the eventual civil register which is being developed with the support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The SDEP project – and the EU separately – provided legal advisory services to the NEC both to help advance the independence issue and revise the complaints and appeals procedures which have been described as cumbersome and complex. Certainly, the directive issued by the NEC on checking/receiving and settling complaints at the CEC level seems to have made a difference, as noted above. While some progress has been made on studying the framework of the complaints and appeals process and producing recommendations, little progress has been made on the issue of NEC independence. This is not necessarily the fault of the SDEP project or of the NEC per se, as it is clear that the issue of NEC independence has been pushed as far as it can within the confines of the institution itself. It is, in fact, unreasonable to expect the NEC to reform itself from within when the requisite political will to render the NEC truly independent – in its freedom of action, in its financing, in how its members are appointed or removed, and in who it reports to – is missing. If lack of political will is the root cause of the NEC's lack of independence, then it must be tackled at a higher level of policy dialogue and advocacy, and using different entry points that the NEC per se.

d. Increased civic engagement, participation and democratic culture

Summary of Component 3: In contrast with the above area, the work on civic engagement, participation and democratic culture showed both significant results and promise for future engagement. This component had two main outputs: the Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) meetings which were facilitated among the government, political parties and civil society;

and the Equity News and Equity Weekly work that was intended to increase independent and balanced news coverage.

The COPCEL process has been ongoing for several election cycles and has a solid reputation as well run and constructive, both at national and local levels. For the current project period, COPCEL produced an additional feature of media summaries (where relevant, translated from Khmer into English) that seemed to be appreciated by stakeholders but at the end of the day were considered of little actual use apart from general information purposes (the Review Team was told that this was particularly so of the bi-monthly news analysis done by a Cambodian resident outside the country). The lessons learned seminar sponsored by Cambodia Development Research Institute (CDRI), the main partner in the COPCEL initiative, was very much appreciated by all stakeholders – particularly the NEC – as a means to identify what areas should be of priority in the next five years before the national elections of 2013.

The Equity News programme during the election period was highly praised and appreciated by all the stakeholders who mentioned it in interviews with the Review Team. The programme covered campaign activities of all 11 political parties that contested the election, along a formula of proportional or equitable coverage. Even though this formula meant that the ruling CPP party had the lion's share of coverage, the fact that the opposition parties and their campaign activities had an opportunity to be seen, in prime time, cannot be underestimated. This small step has served to open the media space ever so slightly and has subtly changed the expectations of the viewing public. The Review Team was told that Equity Weekly was also an appreciated programme – perhaps more for its potential than for its actual delivery. Some interlocutors noted that Equity Weekly has responded over time to claims that it has not tackled difficult and even gently political subject matters, by scheduling programmes that tackle issues of policy reform where the government does not always appear in a favorable light. Certainly there is much potential to build on in the Equity tandem – in the form of expansion into other media such as radio, in using the professional team of Equity personnel to train others, and in expanding into private media.

e. National elections of 2008

Summary of Component 4: This element of the project had a distinct life and implementation modality compared to the first three outputs. It included support to resource mobilization and management; coordination of donor activity in support to the national elections of 2008; and direct budget support to the NEC. UNDP helped to mobilize 40 percent of the total election budget, and held briefing meetings prior to election day as well briefing sessions for international observers.

UNDP received good feedback for its role in coordinating activity around the national elections of 2008, particularly from the diplomatic community and development partners. The NEC was highly appreciative of the budget support, though the members did mention the complexity of the UNDP's financial procedures when asked if they had any issues with the support. Certainly this element of the project was facilitated by the credibility that UNDP has built through the SDEP work in the

previous three components, and its ongoing work as a convener and coordinator of development assistance at country level.

f. Project Management

The mid-term review in May 2007 made significant recommendations with respect to the management arrangements of the SDEP project and the project's governance. In the 18 intervening months, the project management seems to have consolidated and become much smoother. The team working on the project is sitting in one location and individuals visit national institutions on a regular basis to provide advisory services. The Project Executive Group also met far more than when the mid-term review visited (it had only met once as of May 2007) and seems to have played a more active and helpful role in the strategic decisions taken on behalf of the project.

III. Political Analysis

Given that the UNDP country office would like to extend the SDEP project and build on the gains outlined above, the Review Team was asked to provide strategic recommendations on areas in which SDEP should focus in the next two years. Before doing so, however, the political situation must be analyzed with a view to understanding the dynamics, potential entry points and risks that future assistance may face.

a. Political background

Since the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991, the United Nations has assisted Cambodia in its post-conflict resolution and in its efforts to build peace and security. As a result of the first post-transition national elections in 1993, the country moved from a one-party communist state to a pluralistic democracy and market economy. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) withdrew its peacekeeping troops the same year, leaving behind a 20-person Military Liaison Team which was reduced to one person by 1994. A small office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General remained to observe and report on political events. However, despite mounting tensions, there was a lack of support by member states for a more active political role. While the UN did play a key role in negotiating for the holding of the 1998 elections and the participation of FUNCINPEC, its role was ultimately largely limited to the coordination of international electoral observers. UNDP remained in Cambodia to engage on all areas of development cooperation and democratic governance issues. Some have argued that UNTAC withdrew too quickly after the 1993 elections, which were marked by politically motivated killings and systematic intimidation, and that the UN should have stayed longer to support the country following these elections.

An uneasy balance of power resulted from the outcome of the 1993 elections, with the winning party FUNCINPEC, led by Prince Ranariddh, gaining a clear majority. The power struggle which resulted between FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) culminated in an uprising four years later by Hun Sen, and widespread fighting in the streets of Phnom Penh between

FUNCINPEC and the CPP. The 1998 elections which followed resulted in a win for the CPP, which was obliged to form an uneasy coalition with FUNCINPEC because it did not win enough seats to form a government by itself. Hun Sen was appointed Prime Minister and Norodom Ranariddh, President of the National Assembly. The social-liberal Sam Rainsy Party, formed at this time and led by Sam Rainsy, emerged as the third largest party in Cambodia, with over 20 per cent of the votes.

Under a number of incentives, the majority of its members have steadily abandoned the party in favor of the CPP. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hun Sen retains his leadership of the CPP, and has expanded his total control over the Government and the legislature, in an undisputed consolidation of power. The Review Team was told by opposition parties and civil society watch groups that a "climate of fear" prevails in Cambodia, with allegations of the Government presiding over systematic corruption and manipulation of the judiciary. There were also reports of a large number of defections from the Sam Rainsy Party to the CPP, just prior to the 2008 elections.

b. National elections 2008

In this context, the campaign period and the national elections themselves, held on 27 July 2008, were marked by a drastic reduction in political violence from previous years. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), only one death during this period was attributable to a politically motivated killing, which is a likely indication of the growing confidence of the CPP that the Party was in sufficient control of the media and the national institutions. The outcome was a complete lock on power by the CPP, which gained three quarters of all seats in the National Assembly, a sufficient majority to introduce constitutional changes if they so choose. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) won 26 seats, the Human Rights Party (HRP) 3 seats, FUNCINPEC 2 seats, and the Norodom Ranariddh Party 2 seats. Important to note is that the CPP, while large, is not a monolith. It has an excessively top heavy cabinet, now standing at 444 cabinet ministers, which includes several powerful and wealthy factions, and with the potential for fragmentation. However, the CPP remains extremely well organized and structured, and presents a united and powerful front to the general population.

Although technical aspects to electoral assistance are working better than ever before, one question emerges in the face of this consolidation of power: to what extent is the United Nations contributing to strengthening the 'status quo' of the ruling party. The Needs Assessment Mission conducted in 2005 by EAD/DPA questioned whether UNDP's assistance, at times uncritical of the country situation, might be serving to reinforce a political system which conducts technically acceptable elections but which lacks meaningful democratic reforms. Concerns were raised at that time by DPA that "the UN's involvement may be used by the current government to legitimize a process which is flawed, when viewed from the broader political and human rights perspective." However, despite the validity of these earlier observations, interlocutors during the current mission unanimously requested that the UN 'stay engaged' to take advantage of the small democratic opening which has been created following the 2008 elections, which could be built on through more targeted

assistance, including dialogue processes and capacity building in various areas (see Section IV below).

c. **Mission political findings**

As noted above, the Review Mission met with a broad range of stakeholders, including members of the lead opposition parties, the ruling party, civil society, members of the diplomatic community including major donors, staff at the NEC and media specialists. All interlocutors identified similar areas of concern surrounding the 2008 national elections, focused mainly on unequal media access, voting irregularities, lack of impartiality of the NEC or independence from the Ministry of the Interior, and restricted participation in government by opposition parties. These are elaborated on one by one below.

i. <u>Un Unequal access to media by political parties.</u> Although access to media during the campaign period has improved since 2003, candidates from the CPP had an advantage throughout the year in accessing TV and radio. Campaigning officials were also able to use government funds and vehicles during the campaign period. In addition to this imbalanced use of state resources and public appearances, opposition parties were restricted to an official 30-day time frame for media coverage. However, all opposition parties agreed that media access was made available through the NEC and the Equity News programme, both direct outputs of the SDEP project under review. While this access was not equal, it is the only time that any political parties outside of the ruling party have been allowed access to public media, and as such is considered a step forward. At the same time, the Review Team heard that opposition parties and candidates had difficulty in securing air time on private media outlets, as some of these were reluctant to anger the ruling party.

ii. <u>Voting irregularities:</u> Lead opposition parties, the SRP, FUNCINPEC, the Human Rights Party (HRP) and the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) were very focused on details surrounding voter irregularities, and all four parties signed an open letter calling on the Cambodian public opinion and the international community not to recognize the results of the elections, claiming they were "manipulated and rigged by the ruling Cambodian People's Party". The mission also heard major accusations leveled at the role of the village chiefs aligned with the CPP, who were claimed to have exerted undue influence on voters and on voting procedures. There were widespread claims that polling officials at the local level also issued 1018 forms to illegitimate voters on election day itself, as well as tampering with voter lists and even marking ballot stubs to create the perception that voters could be later identified. Several appeals were registered with the NEC following the elections, although no action has yet been taken to address them.

iii. <u>National Electoral Committee:</u> Members of the opposition parties and civil society with whom the Review Team met reported a lack of impartiality on the part of the NEC and a

complicated or inadequate complaints and appeals process. The role of the police, while professional, was not considered impartial by key NGOs involved in monitoring the vote. Subtle intimidation involving police proximity to polling booths, and the use of marked cars and phones displaying the logo of the CPP were also cited.

iv.   Restricted participation in government: Those opposition parties which had obtained seats in the National Assembly recognized that they faced serious difficulties in attempting to participate in Assembly debates due to their small numbers, which precludes the participation by any group numbering under 10. FUNCINPEC and the NRP have already aligned themselves with the CPP in the government, to enable them to speak in the National Assembly, further contributing to erasing their party lines. While coalitions between opposition parties were considered difficult, given the personality politics involved, the possibility was not ruled out, with the SRP and the HRP agreeing that they should strengthen their internal structures and develop their party platforms. Both parties also indicated that they would re-evaluate their previously confrontational position with the CPP and use a more strategic and subtle approach in order to achieve their objectives.

d. UN concerns

The UN continues to look at ways to engage the government in the areas of democratic governance, democratization and human rights, in an effort to encourage a space for debate and the expression of opposing viewpoints. However, despite 15 years of UN assistance since the 1993 elections, with high levels of international donor aid and technical cooperation, the much-needed institutional reforms necessary to build a true democracy in Cambodia have not yet been achieved. In addition to these concerns, reports of corruption continue to surround the slow progress of the Extraordinary Court in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) of the Khmer Rouge Trials, with reports of kick-backs by national employees at the ECCC. The allegations are threatening to undermine the legal standing of the court, and are currently under close review.

Another source of concern is the Government's poor human rights record and failure of political will to adhere to the rule of law, as reported by Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Human Rights, Yash Ghai, in 2006 and 2008. The SRSG, who is now the Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Cambodia, reported a number of forced evictions, resettlements and land grabs, with economic concessions awarded to large development corporations, have widened the gap between rich and poor, with little or no access to the law or recourse to compensation by those affected. The visible wealth in the capital, Phnom Penh, the proliferation of luxury construction, notably banks and casinos, marks a prosperity which is only enjoyed by a few. Corruption permeates all sectors of society, especially the extractive resource industries (timber, gems, rubber and fishing).

IV. **Future Areas of Support**

Notwithstanding the cautionary points revealed by the political analysis, the Review Mission heard from a wide variety of stakeholders – national and international alike – that the UN must stay engaged in electoral assistance specifically and democratic governance support more broadly. It is clear that the post-2008 electoral period has provided a certain democratic momentum to enable increased advocacy with the government. There has also been recognition on the part of the government that some irregularities, such as voters' lists, do need to be improved upon, and leaders have shown a willingness to engage on these technical issues. The question then becomes not so much whether to provide support but how to provide it in a manner that incrementally opens the democratic space and targets key agents of change rather than reinforcing the status quo.

Based on the assessment of SDEP thus far, and the political analysis which sets the context for future support, the Review Team recommends that UNDP Cambodia and its partners reorient the SDEP project over the next two years to focus on improving the enabling environment for free and fair elections in Cambodia. Refocusing in this manner will mean shifting support from institutional development of the NEC and tackling issues of NEC independence from within, to engaging with other actors and entry points within the electoral cycle albeit in a more concentrated manner.

a. **Improved Electoral Processes**

The Review Team believes that the NEC possesses the capacity to administer professional elections and to build up its internal structures and procedures over time. These areas should therefore not be a primary target for the SDEP project during its second phase. However, given the time and effort that has been invested over the past decade in building mutual trust between UNDP and the NEC, an effort should be made to stay engaged with the electoral management body and offer it expertise and advice as needed. The NEC is also conscious of projecting an image of impartiality with the general public, and has proposed ways in which to make improvements, including relocation away from the Ministry of the Interior. It had also demonstrated a willingness to work with the UNDP project on the specific areas which require strengthening. The following areas in particular are recommended for engagement:

    i.   <u>Advisory services to the NEC</u>. It is uncertain whether further legal advisory capacity is needed or wanted on the issue of NEC independence or otherwise, given the limitations of what can be done without the requisite political will within the government for reform; the NEC's articulation of its own needs; and the current EU Legal Advisor and plans to continue this support into 2009. At the same time, the issue of NEC independence continues to plague the institution and detract attention from the NEC's technical competence.

        The Review Team believes that a **Senior Electoral Advisor with a legal background who understands legal reform and who can push the reform agenda** – including independence – deftly from its other institutional facets, including the Ministry of Interior, could be of use in

this context. Based in the SDEP project team office, this person could perform legal advisory and other functions (including, perhaps, serve as the project executive). In this case, the Senior Electoral Advisor would be a Chief Technical Advisor for the project and sit in the project office. There would then need to be a lower level person in the project office who could also provide technical assistance as needed but who would have more of a project manager, administration role. The Senior Advisor could also be at the disposal of the NEC for other advisory functions and could help the institution further build its self-confidence and become less defensive in its dealing with political parties, civil society, the media and the development partners.

Work done with the NEC through this policy advisory window should also continue to encourage and promote the NEC-political party fora. Linkages could be sought and promoted with the LEAP on electoral law reform, which would eventually be taken up by the Standing Committee as well as the Committee responsible for Legislation and Justice in the National Assembly.

ii.   Voter registration. At all the meetings of the Review Team with stakeholders there was, to some degree, criticism of the **voter registration** process undertaken by the NEC, and the follow-on effects on the 2008 elections. Given that the NEC does not have the resources to conduct a fresh voter registration, of major assistance in rectifying these issues will be the NEC use of data drawn from the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) national identification (ID) card database (this is discussed further in this report under the heading of "Support to the National ID Card Programme").

However, even at the stage when the single MOI ID database has been successfully and fully established, the NEC will not be able to automatically accept and utilize the data from this source. There is a need to design an interface between the MOI database and the NEC voter register database. Also, as the MOI ID database is not updated continually with changes of individuals' addresses, the NEC will still need to continue with its own voter registry updates. The ability to match fingerprints from data held in the MOI database will very much help with updating the voter register as the technology should identify duplicates within the database. The Review Team also heard that the civil registry process – in discussions and now beginning implementation with Asian Development Bank (ADB support) would provide yet another possible source of information for the voter register. The Team was told that eventually the plan is to link all three system – voter register, national ID card and civil registry – by issuing every person a unique number in the civil registry that will then be used for the national ID card (perhaps before the next election) and then, by extension, for the voter list (but probably not in time for the next election).

As discussed with the NEC, **UNDP provision of a database/voter registration expert should be offered to the NEC to help with the design of the interface and the necessary associated update processes.** This assistance may also be an opportunity to advise the NEC

on its current field update procedures including the role of village chiefs and commune councils, and on possible improvements in the processing of deletion lists. This person can also provide technical advice to the interagency working group that will be established by the MOI to assess the voter registration process and linkages with the ID card systems.

A necessary part of data matching between agencies is a legal agreement on responsibilities. In order to promote the independence of the NEC, the proposed UNDP voter registration assistance to the NEC should also include assistance with the drafting of a sample Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the MOI and the NEC, which formally sets out each the responsibilities of each office in relation both to data access and interrogation of the MOI database, and to the maintenance of a separate NEC-controlled voter registration database. Distinct lines of communication between the two entities must also be established, together with clearly defined staff management rules. Such an MoU will also assist in the promotion of the NEC as an independent body as it demonstrates an arm's length attitude to direct government and gives a strict set of rules to NEC interaction with the MOI.

The Review Team recommends that the expert to be retained by the SDEP project starts in early 2009 and initially deploy for three months. Unless one person can be found who can combine all attributes, UNDP should consider a team of two: one person who does the technical database design and another person who is a voter registration expert. The terms of reference should include consultation, design and testing of the system.

iii. <u>Procedures and regulations</u>. During its meetings, the Review Team received many complaints from stakeholders concerning the complaints and appeals process, and the associated legal framework. There is a definite need for legal assistance to the NEC in this area – legal assistance which simplifies both process and framework.

However, as noted above, the NEC already has the assistance of an EU-funded Legal Adviser. This Adviser is currently working on issues which were the basis of many complaints concerning the recent registration and election. These include voter registration (deletion lists), use of form 1018 and the addressing the difficulties with having two types of complaints and associated timelines of each. The EU Legal Adviser is also working on sample training manuals for lodging complaints and appeals.

This Legal Advisor is in place until the end of 2008, but the NEC and the European Commission delegation informed the mission that this assistance would likely be extended into 2009. In case the EU Legal Advisor is not extended into 2009 and the proposed outputs from are not completed, UNDP should ascertain whether further legal assistance to the NEC is required and, if so, in what areas.

iv. <u>Support to the National ID Card Programme</u>. As stated above in the section on voter registration, the Review Team heard many complaints concerning the NEC voter registration process – especially on the issues of duplicates on the current NEC voter register and the NEC deletion lists – and therefore the number of eligible voters missing from the actual voters' register on polling day. In order to assist in rectifying this issue, it is proposed that the NEC access the MOI ID database to determine any duplicates on the NEC voter register. However, before this can happen, the MOI database must first be amalgamated (currently the MOI has three databases containing information on ID applicants); information within that amalgamated ID database must be made electronically useful (two of the three MOI databases need to have all applicant fingerprint images re-input); and finally AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) must be installed on the final amalgamated database.

The Review Team was told that there is a three-phase assistance plan to the MOI designed to achieve the above and produce the useful amalgamated database.[2] These three phases are:

- Phase One: prepare the current system, i.e. the DataCard System® for AFIS installation;
- Phase Two: prepare all ID card data from the two older systems, Chun Hong® and Golden China® for migration to the enlarged database; and
- Phase Three: migrate the ID card data from the two old systems and consolidate National ID Card data at one location for final AFIS installation.

Dependent upon the discussions in the MOI Working Group expected to be convened in January 2009, the Review Team recommends that UNDP assist with the three phases as outlined above but that during these phases good communication and interaction between the MOI and NEC be ensured. When devising the 2009 and 2010 work plans for the SDEP project any activity on the national ID card should be integrated with support to voter registration as part of an overall envelope on 'electoral processes'. This will help ensure the requisite amount of coordination between the two processes and the two institutions in charge of each. No further assistance should be provided to the national ID card system. If there is donor interest to support this work further, every effort should be made to rechannel that interest to other aspects of the SDEP phase two.

b. **Media for development**

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[2] These phases are explained in more detail in the Concept Paper on Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia (Phase II - 2009-2011), July 2008.

The Review Team heard during the mission that access to media – whether public or private – was skewed in favor of the ruling party, and that the quality of media coverage on important issues was not always impartial or of the highest caliber. Certainly a free, vibrant, diverse and outspoken media is an essential and reinforcing element of a democratic system. The project has an existing output focused on increasing independence and balanced news reporting on current political affairs and the team recommends continued emphasis in this area. .

As noted above in the assessment of the SDEP phase one, UNDP has been working on Equity News since 2003 and, more recently, on Equity Weekly. It has built a reputation and a relationship with the Ministry of Information and with TVK, the state television. The UNDP-TVK initiative that produced the Equity programming can be capitalized on to influence Cambodia's wider media environment. If Equity programmes are continuing to be produced, these can be used as a focal point for training other print, radio, television and online journalists, producers and editors. As described in the July 2008 concept paper, hands-on training programmes as well as seminars can be used to teach the principles of fair and balanced journalism and to spread a media code of conduct based on the one used for the Equity programmes. SDEP phase two could also focus on improving the legal and regulatory framework related to the media.

The following initiatives could be undertaken, in close collaboration with a Media Expert, to improve the media environment in Cambodia:

i.   Legal framework and self-regulation. SDEP could assist in the drafting of a Media Law which would include analysis, information and reform of the country's laws and directives governing the media. Even beyond the legal framework per se, UNDP could support the move towards more self-regulation in the form of voluntary codes of conduct that encourage professionals to adhere to a set of ethical standards. SDEP could also push for implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, drafted with support from the World Bank, as part of improving the enabling environment.

ii. Equity programming. The Equity brand should not exist as a stand-alone component in the second phase of SDEP but rather should be combined with other media development areas. It is imperative that the space that has been opened by Equity is maintained and built on with broader media support. The Equity concept should continue and expand. Equity Weekly could expand the types of issues addressed, covering more hard news. The Equity team can train other media outlets, sensitize senior editors at TVK and branch out into new programming such as 'My Commune' which provides a good potential link to UNDP's work on decentralization and local governance. The MOI has agreed to syndicating the Equity programmes branded as a "TVK Production" and the Equity team could explore agreements with more entertainment-oriented channels that enjoy higher viewership to rebroadcast the programme. The team should also adapt it for radio and ensure its widespread distribution. UNDP should work on ensuring that there is village-level access to Equity programming. Equity Weekly also needs to find a local sponsor along the lines of a Public Broadcasting

Service (PBS) foundation support so that it can be independently funded and produced by the end of the expansion phase.

Given that the mission did not consult with any journalists or media associations, **the Review Team recommends that a Media Expert should be asked to come to Cambodia and help UNDP flesh out this area further**. UNDP should also consider tapping media expertise from the UN's Department of Public Information (DPI) and/or the Bureau for Development Policy. These advisors could help prioritize the areas that need attention in the short, medium and long term into the new CPAP period.

c. Dialogue, civic engagement and political party support

The Review Team recommends that SDEP phase two consolidate a number of areas in which it has worked, and expand into some other areas, under the heading of dialogue, civic engagement and political party support. As revealed in the assessment of SDEP phase one, brokering dialogue – whether it was among electoral stakeholders at the local level through COPCEL or among political parties at the national level – were considered relevant and useful. Dialogue as a conflict management tool should be continued and deepened, with both civil society and with political parties. Civic education and engagement – particularly at the local level and with youth – is seen as a critical need. The NEC also sees a need for civic and voter education of all electoral stakeholders. There are strong potential linkages between such work and the decentralization and local governance commune-level work and the LEAP work within the Legislature and with its constituency outreach work.

i. Dialogue. The Review Team believes that there is merit to the suggestion to promote dialogue between and within civil society and various government actors – at national and sub-national levels. However, the design of such dialogue needs to be carefully considered so as to avoid promoting dialogue for dialogue's sake. Issue-based dialogues, based on the tested NEC-political party dialogue and other methodologies used by SDEP, should continue to be supported by the project. UNDP could look into DPA's Mediation Support Unit (MSU) and BCPR to support them in implementation.

ii. Civic engagement. With 70% of the population in Cambodia below the age of 30 and a significant bulge in the 15 and under age group, civic education, voter education especially for first-time voters, and participation in governance are key means through which to enhance participation and foster the demand for wider democratic space in Cambodia. The SDEP project in its second phase should look into resuscitating the idea – present in the original project design – of a broad civic education initiative that could bring in other elements of youth participation and voter awareness. At the time of the mid-term review in 2007, the school-based civic education component of the project was already being funded and implemented by other agencies through other projects. This should be checked again for currency, however, given the number of times interlocutors mentioned the importance

of civic education to the Review Team as something they saw UNDP doing and doing well. Given the modest resources likely to be available in the second phase of SDEP, however, if work in this area proceeds, it should be kept fairly limited. For example, SDEP could work on developing a curriculum and training of trainers for civic education for the Ministry of Education targeting 15 to 17 year olds and then some targeted civic education messages related to advocacy and building constituencies for the needed legal reforms and dialogue that will be promoted by the project.

iii. <u>Support to political parties</u>. Work with political parties should be approached with care. Highly sensitive and specific work on training, capacity, workshops, internal functioning, etc. or direct resource support should be left to assistance providers in the area with a higher capacity and track record in the area (such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and perhaps others such as the party internationals).

Instead, UNDP through the project should focus on improving the overall political party system. Activities could include promoting party roundtables on strengthening the enabling environment for a democratic multi-party system, development-related topics, and promoting women's role within parties while linking to the work LEAP is doing in the legislature with women's caucuses. Decentralized work with parties – to, for example, establish resource centers that they can use to access information, publications, video presentations, the internet and meeting space – is in theory a good area to move into and is certainly needed. However this should be considered for the post-SDEP programming as the next cycle of commune and national elections get closer.. Mobile resource centers could be considered as part of the dialogue process and/or linking activities to UNDP's Decentralization, Deconcentration and Local Governance (DDLG) project. The work done during phase one of the project to broker dialogue and improve channels of communications between political parties and the NEC should also continue.

Any assistance would need to be offered to *all* political parties. It is not worth jeopardizing possible UNDP advances with issues such as promoting the independence of the NEC and possible improvement of the voter registration processes in exchange for assistance to parties that is given in a partisan manner or perceived as such.]

d. Gender advocacy

The project document for SDEP and the concept paper of July 2008 both say that gender advocacy should be mainstreamed into each area of activity. There is little explanation, however, of how this will be done. Certainly, as a start, UNIFEM should provide its expertise now on the proposed work plans of SDEP phase two and offer its help in implementing activities to ensure that a gender perspective is being considered. Gender can be addressed in a number of ways through the project – from tackling gender differences in Equity programming, to working with the NEC to advise them on strategies to boost the number of female electoral administrators; from working with female

political party organizers, to covering MDG3-related issues in local dialogue processes. In order to effectively undertake gender advocacy through the project, personnel should be sensitized on gender issues.

e. Management

The project should continue the good practices developed over the past 18 months of housing all of the advisors and administrative staff serving the project in one location or promoting their regular meeting as a team (the TVK Equity staff are in a different location). Advisors to national institutions such as the NEC or media or the national ID card process should spend the vast majority of their time in the national institution but should also take time to check in with the project management. Currently, the project is managed by a Project Manager and this arrangement has worked well. However, the Review Team noted that this could eventually change during the second phase of the project. If this is the case, UNDP should consider recruiting a Senior Electoral Advisor to replace the vacant Chief Technical Advisor post who can serve as the project executive while also providing the high-level policy advisory functions anticipated as the project shifts from direct institutional support to 'softer' elements such as advocacy, policy advice and dialogue, while beefing up new areas such as media development.

f. Longer-term opportunities and change in approach

The above recommendations have been made for the short to medium term (the next two years). However, while implementing these activities, there will be a number of issues and initiatives that were highlighted to the Review Team and/or which might come up and be brought forward beyond 2010 into the new CPAP period.

One of these relates to voter registration. Depending on how data sourcing from the MOI ID database progresses, the NEC may need advice/assistance in voter register cleansing for the 2013 election (e.g., remaining with the existing voter registration processes including assistance of village chiefs and commune councils or the NEC electing to conduct a fresh registration exercise to form the basics of the voter register). Currently the NEC states that it does not have sufficient resources to complete a fresh registration exercise. The voter registration expert to be recruited as per the Review Team's recommendation on support for voter registration and MOI ID database development could also make early recommendations in this area.

During the meeting with the NEC Secretary-General he stated that UNDP could assist in workshops for electoral stakeholders (NGOs, party agents and potential electoral officials). The MOI also said that it intended to do a series of working group meetings at the national and local levels to discuss the issues of voter registration and the involvement of the commune chiefs, police and others. These workshops, at provincial and commune level, could detail the voter registration and election process in the hope that a better understanding of these processes would actually improve the quality of both voter registration and elections – and also at the same time install more trust in the

system. These workshops would be better in the lead up to an election or voter registration exercise.

The decentralization initiative to devolve power and finances away from central government to the provinces and communes, which is a major pillar of the government's rectangular strategy and which is supported by the UNDP, will also provide an opportunity to develop civil society at the district level, which is a longer term endeavor which could increase democracy over time.

Political parties have become accustomed to regular – if limited – media access, as well as some guided debates and discussions, which could be developed further. There is agreement among all stakeholders, especially all opposition parties and NGOs, that the UN must remain engaged through the Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia project, in order to expand the democratic space that has been created post-election and improve the enabling environment.

g. Risk assessment

The Government's confidence at its overwhelming re-election could provide a space to improve on some of the key areas outlined above. However, any steps that are taken should remain low key and should be implemented incrementally, and the degree of possible leverage should be carefully measured. Any pressure or excessive demands on the part of the donor community or experts could produce a backlash on the part of the government. Cambodia's growing wealth and its oil revenues due to flow in 2012 – while limited to relatively few individuals – could create an unstoppable momentum of progress and opportunity for the young technocrats of the next generation. This should be viewed against a background of the large number of disenfranchised and poor who could react violently to increased food and fuel shortages, and there have already been some reported incidents. The many factions and their followers within the CPP leadership, as demonstrated by the excessively large cabinet, while at present well structured and controlled, could disintegrate over time. Decentralization, the active government policy, could contribute to expanding the power base of some factional leaders, which could also cause fissures in the present top-heavy leadership.

UNDP runs the risk of increasing criticism from both NGOs (particularly those in the area of human rights) and opposition political parties by remaining in dialogue with, and giving assistance to, the NEC. However, the Review Team is of the opinion that there is no opportunity for UNDP to withdraw support, as any withdrawal of international support to NEC will only isolate government processes more – and this cannot be good for future governance in Cambodia. Additionally any partnerships which UNDP has built (with the NEC and MOI, with implementing NGOs or by giving basic support to all political parties), can only increase dialogue between these stakeholders and as a result of dialogue increase trust.

UNDP-organized dialogue between stakeholders will assist in mitigating risks to UNDP. The Review Team was told that the multi-partisan work of SDEP and its open door policy has gone a long way to enhancing the credibility of UNDP Cambodia as a trusted provider of electoral assistance. Further

support to dialogue processes can deepen this credibility and keep open the lines of communication with various stakeholders.

V. Follow up, next steps

The SDEP project will need to be extended to end 2010 in order to finish at a time when the new UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) will begin in 2011. To do this, work plans for the concentrated areas described above will need to be finalized and approved by the Project Executive Group.

The Review Team was told that some of the traditional donors to SDEP – including Australia and Canada – would likely not be in a position to provide further financial support given shifting priorities in the area of democratic governance. New donors will then need to be sought, including some non-traditional donors to the sector.

SDEP phase two should also devise a partnership strategy that goes beyond searching for financial donors to the project and maps out areas of converging interest among development partners. For example, there are many potential synergies between work in anti-corruption and civil service reform, decentralization and local governance, and parliamentary development that may be undertaken by other development partners who are not considering a financial contribution to SDEP.

There was some discussion during the Review Mission's stay in Cambodia of merging the SDEP project with the LEAP project on parliamentary development. Even though this might produce some administrative and managerial economies of scale, it is not recommended from the perspective of achieving the results intended. SDEP and LEAP have different targets, stakeholders, approaches, operating modalities and reputations. While it is advisable to promote synergies between activities of the two projects wherever possible – for example, on electoral law reform or supporting women in politics – it is not advisable to merge the two projects at this stage. What should be done, however, is a revision in approach for the next CPAP. Many country offices are now devising large and multidisciplinary deepening democracy programmes, which encompass support to parliament, judiciary, electoral institutions, media and other aspects of governance, where the joint work and linkages are spelled out from the inception.

Prior to the next CPAP period as well, UNDP and DPA should undertake a comprehensive review of electoral assistance in Cambodia within the wider context of democratic governance. While the SDEP project has been subject to numerous reviews during its lifespan, they have tended to focus on the project 'per se'. The electoral cycle and democratic governance in Cambodia could benefit from a step back in the form of a strategic visioning exercise, the results of which could then be used as an input to the next CPAP.

Annex 1: TORs of Mission

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

Project Review of the "Strengthening Democracy
and Electoral Processes in Cambodia" project

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Strengthening Democracy and Electoral Processes in Cambodia Project was signed between the Royal government of Cambodia (RGC) and the UNDP in January 2006. Through this project UNDP and RGC agreed to move beyond the traditional short-term technical cooperation limited to electoral events to longer term support to electoral institutions and assistance to improve electoral legislation and processes with a view to making these more transparent, participatory and independent. The planned project activities reflected that elections alone are not enough to allow democratic values to flourish, but would require greater substantive electoral assistance with broader ranging initiatives involving the Cambodian people as a whole, its civil society and especially the younger generation to foster the emergence of a culture of democracy going beyond the ballot boxes.

A mid-term project review mission was conducted in May 2007 and made recommendations to re-focus the project in advance of the 2008 National Assembly elections. Following the conduct of these elections, and given that the UN has been providing electoral assistance to Cambodia since 1992, it would be useful at this stage to take stock of the impact of such assistance, and to look strategically at future electoral assistance with a view to increased effectiveness and a focused coherent approach.

2. OBJECTIVESOF THE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

The primary objective of the mission is to conduct a comprehensive review of the project results and achievements and to make recommendations for future action. Specific objectives include

1. Assessing the overall performance of the project with reference to its respective strategy, objectives and quantitative an qualitative indicators defined by the project document and the implementation arrangements, and identify major management and operational issues that impacted on the achievement of project objectives.

2. Assessing the relevance of the project in the emerging country context and priorities, taking into consideration other electoral assistance interventions, and to identify possible needs for future electoral assistance.

3. DUTIES/TASKS OF THE ASSIGNMENT

Duties and tasks will include the following:

    a. Conduct a review of the activities being undertaken by the project including:
- Equity news programmes;
- Voter Information Support to NEC;
- Support to MoI towards National ID card programme;
- Support to political parties and facilitation of high level NEC-political parties dialogue facilitated by the project;
- Partnership with civil society organizations; and
- UNDP's coordination and electoral assistance role.

    b. Assess input of UNDP's capacity building efforts for the preparation of the NEC's technical organization of 2008 National Assembly Election;

    c. Determine how NEC performed in the conduct of 2008 National Assembly Election particularly in the areas of complaint management, participation in the electoral process by most vulnerable groups, efforts by NEC to remove obstacles for poor groups, accountability during election and independence of NEC, gender mainstreaming, where NEC stands when compared with 2002 and 2007 commune elections and reliabilities of voter register;

    d. In the light of NEC's performance in 2008 National Assembly Election, identify needs and approach for future technical assistance to further strengthen NEC;

    e. Review the reports submitted by short-term consultants with the aim to identify areas for decreasing or scaling down of future interventions;

    f. Assess existing strategy and identify priority areas of engagement, offering recommendations intended to ensure the coordination of UN assistance with other donor support; and qualify and define priorities for what the UN can and should do.

4. OUTPUTS

The Review Mission will produce a final report of the mission's findings which will be submitted to the UN Focal Point for Electoral Assistance Activities and the UNDP Country Office:

5. ASSIGNMENT METHODOLOGY

Briefing and debriefing meetings will be arranged with UNDP Resident Representative, UNDP Country Director and UNDP Deputy Director for Programme. The UNDP project team and the UNDP Country Office Governance Cluster Team will facilitate day-to-day coordination of the review.

The review mission is expected to employ a variety of methods including documentation review (desk study), direct interviews and meetings with involved stakeholders including donors and government counterparts, and field visits.

6. DURATION AND COMPOSTION

The mission will be conducted from 23 October to 01 November, and will comprise of two representatives of the Electoral Assistance Division and Asia Pacific Division of the UN Department of Political Affairs, and one representative of the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy. The mission team will be led by the expert on governance from UNDPHQ/BDP.

Annex 2: List of Meetings of the Mission

Team members:
1. Linda Maguire, UNDP/BDP --- **092-392 812** --- Mission Team Leader, arrival on 23 Oct by Korean Air at 2220H
2. Anne-marie Ibanez, UNDPA --- **092-995 311** --- arrival on 26 Oct by Silk Air at 0915H
3. Kerry Heisner, consultant representing EAD --- **092-993 466** --- arrival on 24 Oct by Silk Air at 0855H
4. Sue Nelson , independent project formulation consultant --- **092 401 572** --- arrival on 26 Oct by Eva Air at 1145H

<p align="center">Appointment Schedule for Project Review Mission</p>

Date	Time	Institution	Meeting with	Venue	Contact Info	Remarks
24 October/ Friday	8:30 – 9:30 AM	UNDP	Aamir	UNDP	092-850002	Confirmed
	10:00 – 11:00 AM	UNDP	Aamir, Socheath, Ricarda, Jo	Fishbowl, B5, UNDP	Sophorn 200, Jo 208, Ricarda 209, Ismael 219, Socheath 217	Confirmed
	11:30 – 12:30 PM	CDRI	Han Phoumin	CDRI	023 883 603	Confirmed Interpreter
	Lunch	free	free	Free	free	
	2:00 – 3:00 PM	SRP	Sam Rainsy	SRP HQ	092888002 (Samura)	Confirmed Interpreter
	3:30 – 4:30 PM	US Embassy	Greg Lawless	US Embassy	023 728 000 x 8125	Confirmed
	5:00 – 6:00 PM	CPWP	Thida Khus	#6S St 21	012 838 464, Kunthea 012 854 295, office 023 217 872	Confirmed Interpreter
25 October/ Saturday	10:00 – 11:00 AM	COMFREL	Mr Koul Panha	COMFREL # 138, St. 122, PP	012 942 017	Confirmed

Date	Time	Institution	Meeting with	Venue	Contact Info	Remarks
26 October/ Sunday			No appointments			
27 October/ Monday	8:00 – 9:00 AM	NEC	H.E. Im Suosdey	NEC	012 280 444	Confirmed Interpreter
	9:30 – 10:30 AM	TVK	H.E. Kem Gunawadh	MoInformation	012 554 535	Confirmed Interpreter
	11:00 – 12:00	UN – Resident Coordinator	Douglas Broderick	Building 5	Villa 120	Confirmed
	Lunch	AusAID	Arthi Patel, Moniroth	Comme a la Maison	023 213 434	Confirmed
	2:00 – 3:00 PM	FUNCINPEC	H.E. Nhek Bunchhay, Secretary General	FUNCINPEC Headquarters	012 194 3347	Confirmed Interpreter
	4:00 – 5:00 PM	Japanese Embassy	Kazuo Chujo, Yonezawa	Japanese Embassy	023 217 161	Confirmed
	5:30 – 6:30 PM	CDPO	Ngin Saorath	Wat Than, Norodom Blvd.	016 851 841	Confirmed Interpreter
	Dinner (7:00)	Free	Free	Free	Free	
28 October/ Tuesday	8:00 – 9:00 AM	UNIFEM	Lynn Lee	#21, Street 57	012 753 157	Confirmed
	9:30 – 10:30 AM	HRP	H.E. Mr. Kem Sohka	National Assembly – South Building	023 884 649	Confirmed Interpreter
	11:00 – 12:00	SRP	H.E. Mu Suchua	Her office in Parliament	012 831 020	Confirmed Interpreter
	Lunch	USAID/ US Assessment	Harry	Le Duo		Confirmed
	2:00 – 3:00 PM	MOI	H.E. Sak Setha	MOI	012 857 276 (Savuth)	Confirmed Interpreter

Date	Time	Institution	Meeting with	Venue	Contact Info	Remarks
	3:15 – 4:15 PM	NDI	Laura Thompson	#21A Street 352, BBK1	012 381 502	Confirmed
	4:30 – 5:30 PM	EU	Rafael Docheo Moreno	#1, St. 21	023 220 611	Confirmed
	6:00 – 7:00 PM	ADHOC	Thun Saray	#1, St. 158	023 364 735	Confirmed Interpreter
29 October/ Wednesday	8:00 – 9:00 AM	NICFEC	Heng Puthea	#16B St 348	012 959 666	Confirmed Interpreter
	9:30 – 10:30	NRP	H.E. Yu Hockry	NRP HQ	012 800 888	Confirmed
	11:00 – 12 PM	SIDA	Miriam Malqvuist	St. 352	016 544 244	Confirmed
	Lunch	UNDP/TVK	Wayne Sharpe	La Marmite	012 630 385	Confirmed
	2:00 – 2:30 PM	IRI	John Willis	# 213, Street 294	012 912 030	Confirmed
	2:45 – 3:45 PM	OHCHR	Christophe Peshoux	#10, St 302 BKK1	023 216 342	Confirmed
	4:15 – 5:15 PM	UNDP (DDLG)	Patrick Dong	B-6, UNDP	012-333 492	Confirmed
30 October/ Thursday	9:00 – 10:00 am	USAID	Paul Randolph	US Embassy	023 728 000	Confirmed
	10:30 – 11:30 am	Australian Embassy	Ambassador Adamson	Australian Embassy	023 213 470	Confirmed

Date	Time	Institution	Meeting with	Venue	Contact Info	Remarks
	Lunch	UNDP LEAP	Susan Cowley	Le Duo	017-546 482 (Susan)	Confirmed
	2:00 – 2:30 pm	DANIDA	Michael Engquist	DANIDA	012 613 868	Confirmed
	2:45 – 3:15	UNDP/Governance Team	Ismael Toorawa, Heng Socheath	Building 6 – Mission Office	Ismael 219, Socheath 217	Confirmed
	3:30 – 4:30 pm	NEC	H.E. Im Suosdey	NEC	012 280 444	Confirmed Interpreter
	5:00 – 6:00 pm	CPP	H.E. Sey Chhun	CPP Headquarters		Confirmed Interpreter
31 October/ Friday	8:00 – 9:00 am	Free	Free	Free	Free	
	9:30 – 10:30 am	LICADHO	Naly Pilorge	#16, St. 99	012 803 650	Confirmed
	11:00 – 12:00 pm	CIDA	Linda Wishart, Hong Sokheang	CCO	012 925 151	Confirmed
	Lunch	Free	Free	Free	Free	
	2:00 – 3:00 PM	Free	Free	Free	Free	
	4:00 – 5:00 PM	UNDP Senior mangement	Presentation	Lad conference room, B1, UNDP	092-850002	Confirmed